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FLIGHT CHECK: ARE AIR CARRIERS ANY CLOSER TO
PROVIDING GAMBLING ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
THAT LAND OR DEPART FROM THE UNITED STATES?
DARREN A. PRUM, MBA, JD*
I. INTRODUCTION
D ECENTLY, THE DECISION by Ryanair to offer in-flight
X'.video gambling reignited the debate over this activity in the
friendly skies.' More specifically, Ryanair plans to offer its pas-
sengers internet access to one of the world's largest online gam-
bling sites through its in-flight entertainment system.2 This
electronic version follows its popular "Fly to Win" scratch cards
that basically resemble a lottery." According to Ryanair's man-
agement team, it expects to realize vast sums of revenue through
passenger entertainment which it hopes will lead to a strategic
advantage.4 Thus, many commentators believe more of these
types of actions by other foreign carriers will likely force Con-
gress to take action at some time in the future to remove the
current obstacles in the United States to allow gambling during
* Darren A. Prum, MBA, JD, is a Visiting Lecturer in Finance and Business Law
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
I See I. Nelson Rose, Casinos on Cruise Ships, Why Not on Airplanes? 10 GAMING L.
REv. 519 (2006). Ryanair places limitations on its in-flight gambling by only al-
lowing citizens of the departure and arrival countries to participate. Id. at 519.
Moreover, Ryanair operates regularly scheduled flights throughout Europe and
North Africa but not the United States. See Ryanair, Where We Fly, http://www.
ryanair.com/site/EN/dests.php?flash=chk&pos=MYFLIGHT (last visited Nov. 4,
2008).
2 Simona Rabinovitch, Chicken, Fish or Scratch-and-Win? A Flock of Airborne Ped-
dlers Are Gearing Up to Sell You Anything and Everything, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 6, 2007,
at T3.
3 See Rose, supra note 1, at 519.
4 Ben Mutzabaugh, Ryanair May Turn to In-flight Gambling and Free Airfares, USA
TODAY, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://wv.usatoday.com/travel/flights/today/
2005-11-04-sky-archiveoct03_x.htm. The CEO of Ryanair explained that gam-
bling is one of those areas the airline can use to subsidize its overall business in
order to place pressure on its competitors who compete solely on airfares. Id.
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international flights in order to create a level playing field for
American airlines.5
The underlying cause for this disparity begins with the Fed-
eral Aviation Authorization Act of 1994, which places severe lim-
itations on domestic and foreign air carriers' ability to conduct
gambling on long-haul international flights and required a study
to be conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) .6 This action set off numerous protests from sovereign
nations that the United States was imposing its morals and ethics
upon other countries and violating their bilateral treaties as well
as international law.7 With a blatant disregard for those con-
cerns and a determination that the activity could be conducted
safely while flying, the DOT's study concluded that the most
prudent approach for the nation included a wait-and-see strat-
egy to allow monitoring of foreign carriers' progress and experi-
ence before changing course in the United States.'
Since this exercise ofjurisdiction by the U.S. government over
foreign carriers may force those affected to take action, this arti-
cle also considers various techniques available to those countries
or airlines that consider challenging the American position
against gambling on international flights. While a direct chal-
lenge to the ban in the U.S. court system lacks standing, a defen-
dant may assert several defenses to an action by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) for violating either the gambling
ban or the possession of such devices while in a U.S. territory.9
On the other hand, an aggrieved country or foreign carrier may
choose to solve this impasse with a diplomatic approach through
bilateral talks, the International Court of Justice, or the World
5 See generally Christopher M. Carron, Getting Lucky While a Mile High: Challeng-
ing the U.S. Extraterritorial Ban on In-Flight Gambling, 12 GAMING L. REv. & ECON.
220 (2008); Andrew W. McCune & Alexis Andrews, The Legality of Inflight Gaming:
It's Up in the Air, 2 GAMING L. REv. 361 (1998); Rose, supra note 1, at 520.
6 Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat.
1569. Often, this act is referred to as the Gorton Amendment because it was
inserted by Senator Slade Gorton of Washington. Rose, supra note 1, at 519.
7 See id. at 520.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: VIDEO GAMBLING IN FOR-
EIGN AIR TRANSPORTATION 2 (1996), available at http://ostpxveb.dot.gov/avia-
tion/intav/gambling.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS].
9 See Carron, supra note 5, at 221; McCune & Andrews, supra note 5, at 369.
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Trade Organization.' 0 As a result, the last resort may include
retaliatory acts against the United States, causing a trade war.
1
Finally, the crash of Swiss Air Flight 111 and the passage of the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) present
new challenges to in-flight gaming. This may require a further
evaluation of their application to overturning the prohibition.
While the Swiss Air accident seems like an unfortunate tragedy,
one of the underlying causes for its demise led investigators to a
faulty, in-flight entertainment system that delivered gambling ac-
tivities to its passengers. 12 This FAA-approved system forced
many to reconsider the then existing technology and whether
gambling could be delivered safely during a flight. 3
Similar to in-flight gaming, Congress passed the UIGEA to
curb internet gambling.14 Instead of determining the legality of
internet gaming, this legislation concentrated on the payment
systems used to collect wagers and pay out winnings to gam-
blers. 5 Furthermore, the Act requires the U.S. banking system
to implement safeguards that prevent American citizens from
participating in these legal, foreign gambling sites, which may
be accessible while on an international flight.1
6
Hence, the complexities of overturning the U.S. ban on in-
flight gambling are now more complicated than ever due to the
layering of anti-gaming laws. While the ability to deliver the ac-
tivity in a safe and secure manner always remains a priority, a
challenge to the law preventing in-flight gaming now requires a
10 See Carron, supra note 5, at 224-26. Many treaties call for the International
Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization (WTO) to resolve trade dis-
putes involving member nations. Id. One successful country convinced the WTO
that the American ban on internet gaming was hypocritical; while the European
Union effectively utilized noise restrictions on aircraft to bring the U.S. govern-
ment to the negotiating table for another dispute. See, e.g., Brian E. Foont, Com-
ment, American Prohibitions Against Gambling in International Aviation: An Analysis of
the Gorton Amendment Under the Law of the United States and International Law, 65 J.
AIR L. & COM. 409, 418-19 (2000); Declan McCullagh, WTO Slams U.S. Net-Gam-
bling Ban, CNET NEWS, Apr. 7, 2005, http://news.cnet.com/ rTO-slams-U.S.-Net-
gambling-ban/2100-1030_3-5658636.html.
1 Jesse Witt, Comment, Aces & Boats: As the Popularity of Cruise Ship Gambling
Soars, Why Do the Airlines Remain Grounded?, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 353, 357 (2001).
12 Gary Stoller, Doomed Plane's Gaming System Exposes Holes in FAA Oversight, USA
TODAY, Jan. 2, 2004, at lB.
13 Id.
14 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
347, § 802, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367).
15 Id. § 5364.
16 Id.
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higher standard of safety due to the Swiss Air tragedy and an
exception to the UIGEA's banking limitations. Therefore, an
attack on the Gorton Amendment through the courts or by
utilizing other means will be insufficient and will now require
congressional action, at a minimum, to make gambling legal to
Americans on international flights, whether the carrier is for-
eign or domestic.
II. FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994
Under the Gambling Devices Act of 1962, the government
prohibited U.S.-flagged carriers from providing gambling on in-
ternational flights.' 7 Yet, foreign-flag carriers were exempt from
this ban through an unintentional loophole in the law and
could offer in-flight gambling.'8 As a result, Northwest Airlines
attempted to create a level playing field with its foreign counter-
parts by seeking legislation that legalized in-flight gambling for
all carriers on international routes in 1994.19
In a response led by vocal, anti-gaming activist Senator Slade
Gorton of Washington, an amendment was introduced to the
Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1994 banning in-flight
gaming even further than the existing laws. 2° This new proposi-
tion tried to create a level playing field by completely banning
all gambling activities on both domestic and foreign airlines.2'
The amendment to the bill received acceptance by Congress
without any debate.22 The amendment stated: "An air carrier or
foreign air carrier may not install, transport, or operate, or per-
mit the use of, any gambling device on board an aircraft in for-
eign air transportation. '23 Thus, the law created two distinct
exclusions: the inability of a carrier to provide in-flight gam-
bling, and the incapacity to even have gaming devices on the
aircraft while in the United States or its territories.24
17 See Gambling Devices Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (2000).
18 Id. § 1172(a).
19 Rose, supra note 1, at 519.
20 Id. The author further explains that the Senator was later unsuccessful in
his bid for reelection, partly due to supporters of gaming contributing heavily to
the opposing candidate. Id.
21 See 140 CONG. REc. H7116-02, H7118 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar).
22 See id. H7120.
23 49 U.S.C. § 41311(a) (2000).
24 Id.
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Additionally, the amendment required the DOT to complete
a study examining the safety and competitive implications of al-
lowing gambling on commercial aircraft. 25 Meanwhile, foreign-
flag carriers were forced to compete evenly with U.S.-flag carri-
ers pending the findings and recommendations of the required
study, which ignited huge protests from other sovereign
nations. 26
A. THE LAW CHANGE
While many U.S. airlines have strongly opposed the prohibi-
tion of in-flight gambling, many foreign nations and their air
carriers have been equally critical of the legislation. 27 In a diplo-
matic maneuver, the embassies of Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the European Commis-
sion notified the U.S. Department of State that Senator Gorton's
amendment represented an infringement on each country's na-
tional sovereignty.28 As a result, these governments may con-
clude that this ban on gaming while in non-U.S. territory is a
direct violation of the principles behind international law and
that it may risk the possibility of inciting retaliatory actions by
foreign nations should the U.S. government choose not to
amend the in-flight gambling ban. 29 Interestingly, the U.S. gov-
ernment never responded to the protest.3 0
Furthermore, many foreign carriers have sponsored indepen-
dent legal reviews of the gaming ban with respect to interna-
25 Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
305, § 205(b), 108 Stat. 1569.
26 See Rose, supra note 1, at 520.
27 See generally Position Paper from British Airways PLC to The U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Comments of British Airways PLC Regarding the Department of Trans-
portation Study of Gaming on Commercial Aircraft (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter
British Airways]; Position Paper from The Int'l Airline Coalition on the Rule of
Law to The U.S. Dep't of Transp. (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter Int'l Airline Coali-
tion]; Position Paper from Qantas Airways Ltd. to The U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
Comments of Qantas Airways Ltd. (June 1, 1995) [hereinafter Qantas Airways];
Position Paper from Royal Neth. Embassy, Office of Transp. to The U.S. Dep't of
Transp. (May 24, 1995) [hereinafter Royal Neth. Embassy]; Position Paper from
Virgin Al. Airways Ltd. PLC to The U.S. Dep't of Transp., Statement of Position
of Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter Virgin Ad.].
28 Royal Neth. Embassy, supra note 27, at 1.
- See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 52.
30 Foont, supra note 10, at 416.
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tional air transportation laws." Collectively, they believe that,
while the U.S. government maintains jurisdiction over aircraft
registered in its own country, it has no legal basis to enforce its
laws on foreign carriers outside of U.S. territories regardless of
their destination. 2
The foundations for these opinions were developed from the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of which
the United States is a signatory.3 In Article 1, the document
establishes that: "[t]he contracting States recognize that every
State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory. ' 34 Moreover, Article 11 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regula-
tions of a contracting State relating to the admission to or depar-
ture from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air
navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft
while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all
contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall
be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing
from or while within the territory of that State.35
And with respect to the rules of the air, the first sentence in
Article 12 stipulates:
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure
that every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory
and that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever
such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations
relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force.3 6
Thus, the foreign carriers believe that foreign governments do
not have powers to enforce their laws on a sovereign nation's
aircraft while it is flying over international waters. 7
In response, supporters of the Gorton Amendment counter
that the foreign governments and carriers interpret Article 1
3' See British Airways, supra note 27, at 2; Int'l Airline Coalition, supra note 27,
at 6; Qantas Airways, supra note 27, at 2; Virgin At., supra note 27, at 2.
32 British Airways, supra note 27, at 2; Int'l Airline Coalition, supra note 27, at 6;
Qantas Airways, supra note 27, at 2; Virgin At., supra note 27, at 2.
33 Convention Between the United States and Other Governments Respecting
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 80, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinaf-
ter Chicago Convention].
-4 Id. art. 1.
35 Id. art. 11.
36 Id. art. 12.
37 See generally British Airways, supra note 27; Int'l Airline Coalition, supra note
27; Qantas Airways, supra note 27; Royal Neth. Embassy, supra note 27; Virgin Atl.,
supra note 27.
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"very narrowly."38 They explain that the International Airline
Coalition takes the position that the U.S. government does not
have the right to impose its laws and regulations while a foreign-
flagged aircraft travels outside U.S. territory and airspace. 9
However, the supporters of the U.S. action look at these treaties
from a contracts perspective and argue that the foreign airline
logic ignores the possibility that each country voluntarily accepts
restrictions from the other nation when it allows its aircraft to
enter U.S. territories and airspace.40 Hence, foreign-flag carri-
ers willingly choose to accept the prohibition against gambling
equipment when they decide to fly to a U.S. destination.4 1
In addition, Article 6 of the Chicago Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation provides "No scheduled international air
service may be operated over or into the territory of a con-
tracting State, except with the special permission or other au-
thorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of
such permission or authorization."42 Based on this provision,
the supporters of the Gorton Amendment further assert that
their interpretation is correct because this article enables signa-
tories of the convention to dictate terms and conditions for
flight into its sovereign territory and airspace.43
Accordingly, the legality of the Gorton Amendment and its
ability to force airlines of foreign countries to follow the law of
the United States is questionable at best.44 While the United
States maintains international treaties that allow aircraft from
other nations to enter and land in its territories and airspace,
the documents only set safety standards and are silent with re-
spect to gambling.4 5 Therefore, Congress most likely does not
have the power to unilaterally change a treaty, but that leaves
the aggrieved nations and their airlines in a position where re-
taliatory action serves as the main response for conduct they
cannot accept."
38 Steven Grover, Comment, Blackjack at Thirty Thousand Feet: America's Attempt
to Enforce Its Ban on In-Flight Gambling Extraterritorially, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv.
231, 238 (1998).
39 Id. at 239; Brian C. O'Donnell, Comment, Gambling to be Competitive: The Gor-
ton Amendment and International Law, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 251, 263 (1997).
40 Grover, supra note 38, at 239,
41 Id.
42 Chicago Convention, supra note 33, art. 6.
43 Grover, supra note 38, at 239.
4 See Rose, supra note 1, at 520.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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B. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STUDY
In the study phase of the Gorton Amendment, the DOT asked
the general public to comment on three specific topics related
to gambling on commercial aircraft.47 The first area embodied
the safety implications of in-flight gambling including: payment
methods, installation and operations aboard aircraft, and any
residual effects on navigational equipment, passengers, or the
flight crew.48 The second item addressed the competitive conse-
quences of maintaining, removing, or changing the existing re-
strictions on U.S.-flag carriers with relation to: foreign-flag
carriers, code-sharing agreements, and fifth freedom markets.49
Finally, the public was encouraged to express its opinions on
whether gambling should be allowed on any international flight
regardless of the carrier's flag.5" Through this procedure, the
DOT hoped to capture the sentiments and preferences of the
public while formulating policy recommendations that protect
the safety of all those who would be affected.
1. Safety Implications: Payment Methods
With the delivery and subsequent usage of individualized en-
tertainment options to passengers, interaction amongst travelers
during the time the aircraft is airborne became more complex.5
One of the main concerns encompassing this area included the
payment methodology effect on flight safety.52 This facet was
acknowledged very early in the product development stage as
both manufacturers and airlines preferred a system that could
collect debts and pay winnings with little or no impact on flight
cabin staff, as well as provide adequate security for the users.53
Specifically, the airlines wanted a cashless system to eliminate
any possible performance of a cashiering function by flight at-
tendants. 54 Therefore, with these constraints, the only feasible
47 Study of Gambling on Commercial Aircraft, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,845, 21,845-46
(May 3, 1995).
48 Id. at 21,846.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5' Position Paper from InterGame to The U.S. Dep't of Transp., Comments on
Specific Questions in the Study of Gambling on Commercial Aircraft Pursuant to
49 U.S.C. 41311(b), at 4 (May 30, 1995) [hereinafter InterGame].
52 See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 1.
53 See InterGame, supra note 51, at 5.
54 Id
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methodologies included the use of smart or credit/charge
cards.55
Some software developers suggested smart cards as a possible
payment option, whereby passengers could purchase special
gambling fare cards at the terminal prior to departure.5 6 The
card would be encoded with credits earned or lost and would
allow the holder to cash it in at the terminal, return it to the
airline for redemption, or save it for use on a future flight.
57
Hence, this method would remove the in-flight necessity to
transact currency but would require the installation of extra
equipment.
On the other hand, the Association of Flight Attendants
pointed out that this system does not eliminate the potential for
in-flight problems.58 The Association believed that customer de-
mand will eventually force airlines that select this system to pro-
vide for airborne purchases, and lost cards will create extra
demands and burdens while in the air.59 Therefore, the flight
attendants predicted that the use of smart cards would encum-
ber them with additional distribution, accounting, and corpo-
rate relations responsibilities and hinder their primary
responsibility of monitoring passenger safety and well-being.6 °
Another method suggested and universally agreed to as the
best system by all the manufacturers and airlines includes the
use of credit/charge cards.6" According to British Airways at the
time of the study, "well over 90% of airline passengers carry one
or more major credit cards. 62 In the mid 1990s, the two largest
credit card companies (VISA and MasterCard) adopted new
5 Id.; Position Paper from Int'l Game Tech. to The U.S. Dep't of Transp., 5/
3/95 Federal Register Notice Regarding The Effects of In-Flight Gaming on
Commercial Airlines, at 2 (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter IGT].
56 See InterGame, supra note 51, at 5.
57 IGT, supra note 55, at 2.
58 See Position Paper from the Ass'n of Flight Attendants to The U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Study of Gambling on Commercial Aircraft, at I (May 31, 1995) [herein-
after Flight Attendants].
59 Id. at 3.
60 Id.
61 See IGT, supra note 55, at 2; Position Paper from In-Flight Phone Corp. to
The U.S. Dep't of Transp., Comments of In-Flight Phone Corporation (May 31,
1995) [hereinafter In-Flight Phone]; Position Paper from Interactive Entm't Ltd.
to The U.S. Dep't of Transp., DOT 75-95-DOT Seeks Comments on Gambling
Aboard Aircraft (May 30, 1995) [hereinafter Interactive Entm't]; InterGame,
supra note 51, at 5; Position Paper from The Sports Network to The U.S. Dep't of
Transp. (May 31, 1995) [hereinafter The Sports Network].
62 British Airways, supra note 27, at 5.
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procedures specifically to allow airline passengers to use their
cards to purchase a plethora of in-flight services, including gam-
ing options." However, within these operating rules, the card
companies also developed policies that required adherence to
security safeguards and authorized usage while gambling.64
These safeguards included:
" Transaction Ceilings: a maximum possible loss limit of $350
per card, per flight; and a maximum possible winnings limit
of ten times the amount wagered or up to $3,500.65
* No On-Board Payouts: winnings must be credited directly to
a cardholder's account.66
" Full Disclosure: the cardholder must receive notification of
the terms and conditions as well as make an affirmative ac-
knowledgement of the disclosure prior to the activation of
the gaming program.6"
" Passenger-Selected Limits: the cardholder must set a loss
limit for the flight before the activation of the gaming
program.68
" Dispute Management: the airlines and their flight crew are
not allowed to resolve gaming disputes.69
* Blocking Capability: the card issuer must allow a specific
cardholder to block gaming transactions on a specific
card. 0
With the credit card companies imposing these restrictions, Brit-
ish Airways believed the added limitations would assist in assur-
ing that flight crew interaction with respect to gaming activities
would be minimal.71 With this methodology, the only time that
flight attendants may be additionally troubled would be when a
cardholder may request a receipt; but few passengers are ex-
pected to seek this option.72 Further, the Association of Flight
Attendants believed that this method "seems to be the least
problematic. ' Thus, with all of these safeguards to protect cur-
63 See Interactive Entrn't, supra note 61, at 3; InterGame, supra note 51, at 6.
64 See British Airways, supra note 27, at 5-6.
6-5 Id. at 5.
66 Id. at 5-6.
67 Id. at 6.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 7.
71 Id.
72 InterGame, supra note 51, at 7.
73 Flight Attendants, supra note 58, at 3.
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rency transactions and safety, the credit/charge card process ap-
pears to be the system of choice.
2. Safety Implications: Equipment
Another area of concern with in-flight gambling is the safety
issue related to the installation and operation of equipment
aboard the aircraft.74 The first experiment with gambling
aboard an aircraft dates back to Singapore Airlines in 1981. 75 At
that time, the airline placed six plastic slot machines at the rear
of one of its Boeing 747 cabins that flew between Singapore and
San Francisco. 76 After a two-month trial, the airline abandoned
the project on the grounds that gambling "didn't match the car-
rier's business-oriented image. 77 However, among the numer-
ous issues, "[s] o many passengers lined up to play the machines
at the rear of the plane that it affected the trim, or balance.
Pilots had to use extra fuel to keep the aircraft level. 7
By 1995, the application of in-flight gaming developed as a
natural extension through the use of computer software pro-
grams that augment the already certified and installed entertain-
ment systems on most aircraft in service. 79 The addition of
gambling to the physical characteristics of an aircraft was simply
the presence of computer code in the existing entertainment
system and did not introduce any new or questionable equip-
ment to the flight environment.8 0 Any airborne entertainment
provisions, including gambling, by virtue of its approval from
the proper authorities, did not have any significant effect on the
operation of the entertainment system, nor did it hinder the air-
craft or its navigational instruments from properly performing
their functions."'
In its study, the DOT found that the introduction of gambling
to the in-flight environment would not pose additional harm to
74 U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 1.
75 Fred Gebhart, High Fliers for High Stakes, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 9, 1995,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/l0/O9/gamble.php.
76 For Airline Boredom, Plastic Slot Machines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1981, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E7D8123BF935A1575BC0
A967948260.
77 Gebhart, supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 See IGT, supra note 55, at 2; In-Flight Phone, supra note 61, at 2; Interactive
Entm't, supra note 61, at 2; InterGame, supra note 51, at 3.
s0 Interactive Entr't, supra note 61, at 2.
81 Id.
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the physical safety of an aircraft or its passengers. 2 The study
explained that within the foreseeable future, enhancements to
the entertainment systems would not provide a basis for extra
concern.
8 3
Furthermore, the FAA certification requirements received a
review. s4 The DOT determined that the agency's process, which
examines numerous technical issues, allows for a system's safe
installation and operation aboard an aircraft.8 5 The DOT also
noted that the widespread installation of electronic entertain-
ment systems might further benefit aviation safety.8 6 Fiber optic
networks, which were already FAA certified as safe, weight re-
ducing, and non-electromagnetic emitting, would likely provide
the basis for the next generation of entertainment systems.87
Thus, from a technical perspective, the DOT study concluded
that the gaming activities aboard any aircraft pose no adverse
effects to the primary purpose of transportation.88
3. Safety Implications: Behavioral Risks
While technical concerns are not a threat to safety, other
questions still remain surrounding the behavioral risks s.8  The
airlines and system manufacturers have made every attempt to
keep the system non-obtrusive and individualized. 0 The passen-
gers received immediate access to "help menus" which provide
guidance through an interactive process to start the gaming
mode.91 From these designs and the use of credit/charge cards,
the software developers predicted that any assistance requested
or volunteered from a crewmember should be negligible. 2
Furthermore, the addition of gambling to the in-flight envi-
ronment will not elicit reactions that are significantly different
from those reactions elicited by entertainment systems already
available.9 3 The cabin environment already receives a wide vari-








90 See generally In-Flight Phone, supra note 61, at 3; Interactive Entm't, supra
note 61, at 2; The Sports Network, supra note 61, at 2-3.
91 The Sports Network, supa note 61, at 4.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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ety of physical and emotional responses, since each passenger
uses the systems for different types of entertainment purposes.94
However, the reactions from gambling should be no different
from those already found on in-flight video games, from a pas-
senger's own personal computer, or from a hand-held video
game system that was brought on-board.95 Also, the small stakes
restrictions will limit the wagering to an entertainment-only op-
tion on long international flights and will not appeal to serious
gamblers.9 6 Therefore, according to the proponents of gam-
bling on aircraft, the extension of in-flight entertainment into
"low stakes" wagering should not create any significant changes
in passenger behaviors.97
In contrast, many people are skeptical of the claims made by
the airlines and the entertainment system manufacturers.98
These groups allege that frustrated, irrational, and losing gam-
blers will behave disruptively and hamper the flight attendants
from properly performing their safety responsibilities.99 Simi-
larly, the interaction between gamblers and non-participants is a
paramount issue and is one of the main reasons that the Associa-
tion of Flight Attendants has vocally opposed the addition of in-
flight gaming."° The attendants believe gambling would re-
quire greater reseating needs and would increase the number of
violent incidents while an aircraft is in transit. 01 Also, new train-
ing for the flight crew would be necessary to handle the new
behavioral occurrences." 2 Since the union has already seen an
increase in the number of incidents of interference, assault,
threats, and intimidation towards flight attendants by passen-
gers, it strongly feels that the risks do outweigh the benefits.10 3
From these opinions, the questionable behavior associated with
94 InterGame, supra note 51, at 4-5.
95 Interactive Entm't, supra note 61, at 2.
96 British Airways, supra note 27, at 1.
97 InterGame, supra note 51, at 5.
98 See generally Flight Attendants, supra note 58; Position Paper from The Nat'l
Council on Problem Gambling, Inc. to The U.S. Dep't of Transp., Comments on
Gambling Aboard Aircraft (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter Nat'l Council on Problem
Gambling].
99 Flight Attendants, supra note 58, at 2; Nat'l Council on Problem Gambling,
supra note 98, at 4.
100 See Flight Attendants, supra note 58, at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 5.
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gambling provides a reasonable belief that a threat to in-flight
safety may exist.10 4
According to the DOT's report to Congress, the already ex-
isting FAA regulations could minimize the behavioral risks in
conjunction with proper design enhancements of the in-flight
entertainment systems.10 5 As of the time of the report, the FAA
flight crew training required instruction on customer dissatisfac-
tion, aberrant behavior, and any other conduct that threatens
the safety of the aircraft or its passengers." 6 Therefore, the
likely behavioral problems encountered by flight attendants
should not be characteristically different from those covered in
the training requirements.10 7
Besides the design features incorporated into the entertain-
ment systems like individualization, cashless transactions, and se-
lective disable functions appeared to assist in limiting behavioral
risks.0 8 Yet, due to the lack of historical data with in-flight gam-
bling, the DOT could not dismiss the possibility that new
problems may manifest as a result of the addition of gaming to
the airborne environment. 109 Hence, the DOT concluded that
it should monitor the results of foreign air carriers and recom-
mend policy changes as data becomes available in the future,
and any formal rulemaking should codify the self-imposed
software safeguards already in place.110
4. Competitive Implications
While the airlines and manufacturers explain that in-flight
gaming is a natural progression, they also contend that the cur-
rent ban will continue to adversely affect U.S. carriers in the
market place."' Because most entertainment systems levy fees
for the usage of their movies, stereo programs, video games,
shopping, telephone, and fax services, the absence of gambling
to this product mix will lessen the U.S. airline industry's ability
to access a large source of revenue.' 12 Since foreign carriers will
104 See id. at 4; Nat'l Council on Problem Gambling, supra note 98, at 2.
105 See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 37.
106 14 C.F.R. § 121.421 (1995).
107 See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 36.
108 Id. at 37.
109 Id. at 36.
11o Id. at 37.
III See IGT, supra note 55, at 2; In-Flight Phone, supra note 61, at 6; Interactive
Entm't, supra note 61, at 4-5; InterGame, supra note 51, at 7-8; The Sports Net-
work, supra note 61, at 5.
112 IGT, supra note 55, at 2; InterGame, supra note 51, at 8.
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be able to provide widespread gaming on non-U.S. routes and
apply the receipts to operational costs, the competitive implica-
tions of not tapping this continuous revenue stream may affect
more than in-flight entertainment.113 Consequently, the indus-
try asserts that the current legislation is unable to perform its
intended goal of "leveling the playing field," but rather it has
provided the foreign air carriers a greater advantage over the
U.S. airlines. 14
As of the time of the study, the software developers forecasted
that the receipts produced through gaming activities during in-
ternational flights will be a significant portion of the total reve-
nue generated by the entertainment systems.'1 5 InterGame, one
of the software developers, estimated the contribution from
gambling to be in the range of forty percent to seventy percent
of the total revenue earned.' 6
Similarly, Ladenburg Thalmann & Company completed stud-
ies predicting entertainment system revenues. 1 7 It forecasted
cash flows of $1 million for wide body aircraft without gaming
and an extra $1 million with its addition.I' 8 The study predicted
that when all 2,000 aircraft already in international service in
1995 become fully equipped with entertainment systems that in-
clude gaming, the airlines could potentially generate approxi-
mately $2 billion annually in revenues." 19 Moreover, it also
anticipated that this number will increase by another $3 billion
with the addition of 3,000 more aircraft by the year 2010.120
Therefore, according to these industry predictions, significant
economic harm would occur to U.S. carriers while they are
forced to sit on the sidelines.' 2'
Most international carriers fly only a small portion of their
routes to the United States and can offer gambling on their do-
mestic and non-U.S. international flights. 12 2 In 1995, the acqui-
sition cost for a complete interactive entertainment system on a
wide body aircraft averaged about $2 million with recurring
113 IGT, supra note 55, at 2.
114 InterGame, supra note 51, at 7.
115 See IGT, supra note 55, at 2; InterGame, supra note 51, at 8.
116 InterGame, supra note 51, at 8.
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costs of approximately $200,000 to $400,000 per year.1 23 These
foreign airlines can apply the additional revenue from gaming
to help offset the operational costs, upgrade/installation of sys-
tems, or reduce ticket prices on routes of their choice. 124 In
contrast, U.S. carriers may not be able to afford and maintain
these entertainment systems without the additional capital from
gambling.1 25 Hence, this would allow foreign carriers the op-
portunity to provide low cost, high quality international service
that U.S. airlines would have difficulty matching. 1
26
Furthermore, on fifth freedom market flights, the disadvan-
tage levied against the U.S. carriers will become even greater. 27
Fifth freedom market flights consist of those routes between two
sovereign nations that receive service by a third country's air-
line.128 This service usually happens as an extension of a flight
originating in the carrier's home country and is subject to the
bilateral agreements of all governments and airlines competing
on the particular route. 29 U.S. airlines will still remain re-
stricted, despite competing against foreign carriers that may
123 Interview with Dr. Samuel Prum, President & COO, Hughes Avicom Int'l,
in Pomona, Cal. (Apr. 2, 1996); see also U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8, at 50.
124 In-Flight Phone, supra note 61, at 6.
125 See InterGame, supra note 51, at 7.
126 Interactive Entm't, supra note 61, at 4-5.
127 Id. at 5.
128 See Foont, supra note 10, at 425 n.9. The author further explains in Note 9
that there are six freedoms:
First Freedom-The right to fly over another country without
landing.
Second Freedom-The right to make a landing for technical rea-
sons ... in another country without picking-up/setting down reve-
nue traffic.
Third Freedom-The right to carry revenue traffic from your own
country (A) to the country (B) of your treaty partner.
Fourth Freedom-The right to carry traffic from country B back to
your own country A.
Fifth Freedom-The right of an airline from country A to carry
revenue traffic between country B and other countries such as C or
D. (This freedom cannot be used unless countries C or D also
agree.)
There is also a "Sixth Freedom" that allows the use by an airline of
country A of two sets of third and fourth freedom rights to carry
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provide gaming. 3 ° Therefore, a potential inequity in service
and price will provide another avenue of injury to U.S.-flagged
carriers. "31
In a similar issue, Qantas Airways questioned the enforceabil-
ity of the U.S. restrictions on code sharing agreements. 3 2 Code
sharing agreements are the prior arrangement by two non-com-
peting airlines to pool their resources and provide specific ser-
vices with each airline issuing its own tickets for a single flight.
During these flights, the logistics necessary to determine the eli-
gibility for each passenger would not be cost effective. 133 Thus,
the current legislation only provides further confusion and dep-
rivation to loyal American passengers.
5. The Analysis
Listening to these and other opinions, the DOT analyzed the
current impact of the gambling prohibition on U.S. airlines.1 34
In its study, the DOT developed three scenarios: (1) no change
to the current law, (2) lift the ban on foreign carriers only, or
(3) repeal the law prohibiting gambling on international flights
for all carriers. 3 5 The analysis assumed all foreign carriers will
provide gaming on both Pacific and Atlantic flights. 36 In addi-
tion, Yankelovich Partners, Inc., under the DOT's direction, per-
formed a survey of current passengers. 37 These results were
used heavily as a representative sample of the public's prefer-
ences.1 38 After assessing the possible situations from the survey,
the Yankelovich study concluded that only four percent of pas-
sengers considered entertainment possibilities as a criterion for
changing to a foreign carrier.1 39 However, the U.S. airlines
stood to lose an estimated $490 million in revenue due to the
absence of gambling on their flights. 4 ° Therefore, the DOT as-
certained that entertainment systems will be installed on U.S.
aircraft regardless of the gaming prohibition.'4 '
130 See Interactive Entre't, supra note 61, at 5.
131 Id.
132 Qantas Ainvays, supra note 27, at 4.
133 Id.
134 See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 38.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 29.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 38.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Furthermore, the DOT attempted to determine what eco-
nomic impact the three scenarios would have on U.S. airlines.'4 2
The first conclusion found it highly unlikely that a significant
change in passenger market share would occur due to the pres-
ence of gambling or lack thereof.143 Also, the DOT approxi-
mated that eighteen percent of all international passengers
would take advantage of gambling opportunities, which was esti-
mated to deprive U.S. airlines of approximately $592 million per
year in revenue. 144 Thus, U.S. airlines could potentially face a
diverse set of strategies on competitive routes by foreign carriers
as a result of the huge capital access differences. 14 5
Similarly, fifth freedom markets posed an even greater dispar-
ity for U.S. carriers where worldwide hubs support air traffic to
many American cities.146 As a result, the DOT anticipated U.S.
airlines will shift a greater volume of international operations to
foreign code sharing partners. 47 With these possible outcomes
imminent, the DOT recognized that "the current gambling ban
may not provide a level competitive playing field for U.S.
airlines.' '14 8
6. The Conclusion
Until the Gorton Amendment, no country in the history of
aviation ever tried to regulate another nation's aircraft outside
its own territorial airspace.'49 Likewise, no country can effec-
tively and legally enforce its maritime laws on ships sailing over
the high seas. 5 ' In its position paper, the International Airline
Coalition on the Rule of Law tied the noted international law
expert Gerhard von Glahn's comments on the attributes of a
sailing ship through international waters to that of an aircraft. 51
Thereby, the coalition concluded that "conduct over the high
seas would be governed by rules issued pursuant to the quasi-
territorial jurisdiction of the state of registration rather than the
extra-territorial rules of some other state."'' 52
142 Id.
143 Id. at 38-39.
"44 Id. at 39.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 42.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 5.
149 Int'l Airline Coalition, supra note 27, at 11-12.
150 Id. at 12.
151 Id. at 13.
152 Id. at 13-14.
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In a related legal issue, the United States has numerous air
service agreements with various foreign nations. In one specific
case, Virgin Atlantic Airways pointed out that a comparable ver-
sion of Article 11 of the Chicago Convention is included in Ber-
muda 2, the latest bilateral agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom.1 53 Virgin asserted that this in-
clusion prevents the United States from mandating any prohibi-
tion of gaming on a U.K.-registered aircraft while it is flying over
the United Kingdom, international airspace, or a third coun-
try. 1 54 As a result, the U.S. government may have lost its rights
to enforce the gambling prohibition on foreign-flagged carriers
by virtue of its ratification of the Chicago Convention and its
decision to participate in formal agreements with other
nations. 15 5
Consequently, the DOT did not overlook these legal issues in
its study. It recognized that the Department of State received
formal diplomatic protests from other nations regarding the
U.S. government's authority to regulate foreign carriers in non-
American territories.1 6 The DOT also conceded that with re-
spect to bilateral agreements, there will be jurisdictional ques-
tions, enforcement difficulties, and potential retaliatory acts.
1 5 1
Moreover, it concluded that by allowing gambling on all carri-
ers, many of the concerns outlined by the foreign governments
and airlines would be removed. 58 Nevertheless, the overall rec-
ommendation by the DOT to Congress did not indicate that
these factors received consideration.
Furthermore, the DOT legal analysis focused on what regula-
tion, if any, should receive consideration if the U.S. government
permits in-flight gaming. 59 At the time of the report, the De-
partment of Justice registered and regulated all gambling de-
vices, and each state administered its own legislation
encompassing the integrity and operations of such equip-
ment.161 In addition, federal law overrode a state's ability to gov-
ern the price, route, or service of an airline. 6 ' Therefore, the
153 Virgin AtI., supra note 27, at 8.
154 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 7, 9.
156 U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 27.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 51.
159 Id. at 3.
160 Id. at 51.
16, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(4)(A) (2000).
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DOT indicated that any decision to allow gaming must provide
guidance as to which government agencies will enforce the op-
erational, logistical, and integral aspects of in-flight gambling.'62
Additionally, the DOT believed that the airlines will use satel-
lites or air-to-ground communications to verify credit cards in
connection with gambling.'63  Unfortunately, this premise
would require greater review and direction of the relevant com-
munication legislations to this new application.'64 Thus, the
DOT concluded that from a regulatory aspect, there is no clear
path on how, who, or what regulation will offer guidance should
the government allow gambling during international flights. 65
III. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING THE ANTI-GAMBLING
POLICY IN AVIATION
While the DOT seemed unwilling to make recommendations
that will allow gambling on international flights with a U.S. con-
nection, some foreign governments or airlines that remain inter-
ested in gambling on international routes may choose to force a
change in U.S. law and policy. These parties may choose any of
three distinct approaches: (1) attempting to get the Gorton
Amendment overturned via the courts, (2) seeking a more dip-
lomatic international solution, or (3) utilizing other tactics. Sev-
eral commentators determined that political pressure from
American airlines due to competitiveness issues whereby the car-
riers with flights outside the reach of the Gorton Amendment
subsidize the entire fleet and force competitive disadvantages,
other nations responding in the form of retaliatory regulations
against U.S. flagged carriers, or an international judicial resolu-
tion will ultimately pressure Congress to change the current
policy. 1
66
A. OVERTURNING THE GORTON AMENDMENT
THROUGH THE COURTS
For the courts to get involved and overturn the amendment, a
certain chain of events must occur, followed by three different
challenges to the law's validity by the defendant airline. First,
the FAA must commence an action against a carrier that in-
162 U.S. DOT REPORT ro CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 6.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 3.
- See generally McCune & Andrews, supra note 5; Rose, supra note 1.
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cludes a violation of the law for operating a gaming system on a
flight to or from the United States or its territories. 167 When this
occurs, the defendant airline may then question the law on the
grounds that it violates treaty obligations, that it defies the gen-
eral principles of international law, and/or that Congress over-
stepped its authority under the U.S. Constitution.6 '
Under the first option of challenging the law because it vio-
lates a treaty, the U.S. Supreme Court already settled this issue
by disallowing court intervention where a conflict occurs be-
tween a congressional act and a treaty.'69 The court explained
that these types of situations are better resolved when left to in-
ternational negotiations.17 0 Hence, this type of challenge ap-
pears less likely to succeed unless there is a Supreme Court
reversal of opinion.
Likewise, a foreign carrier's attempt to use the Gorton
Amendment's violation of international law as a defense in U.S.
courts will also fail. When a conflict occurs regarding territorial
authority and another nation's quasi-territorial jurisdiction, the
order of precedence usually begins with the territorial jurisdic-
tion followed by quasi-territorial rule over personal sover-
eignty. 7' In effect, one country may not apply its laws in the
territory of another nation without consent, and if that occurs,
then the state being violated may protest and possibly seek repa-
rations from the country trying to assert authority. 72 However,
the precedent for resolving conflicts between international law
and U.S. statutes requires that "[f] ederal courts must give effect
to a valid, unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such ef-
fect would conflict with another nation's law or violate interna-
tional law. ' 173 Therefore, commentators conclude the lack of
ambiguity in the Gorton Amendment coupled with ample case
precedent will most likely require a U.S. court to uphold the
1.7 49 U.S.C. § 41311(a) (2000). The FAA commencing the legal action pre-
supposes that an airline chooses to fly into a U.S. territory either having allowed
gambling prior to or during entry or simply transports such equipment without
prior authorization. Id.
168 See Carron, supra note 5, at 221; McCune & Andrews, supra note 5, at 369.
169 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 588 (1884).
170 Id.
171 Carron, supra note 5, at 222; McCune & Andrews, supra note 5, at 369.
172 Carron, supra note 5, at 222; McCune & Andrews, supra note 5, at 369.
173 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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gambling prohibition despite breaching another nation's sover-
eignty under international law. 174
Finally, the last defense to an FAA action includes a U.S. con-
stitutional challenge that Congress exceeded its authority when
it included foreign carriers in the gambling ban. 175 Here, the
court will look to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
Supreme Court precedent where Congress received the author-
ity to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and the inclusion
of territories beyond the United States within its enforcement
jurisdiction. Thus, finding a court willing to overturn the Gor-
ton Amendment on the basis of a constitutional challenge seems
extremely improbable since gambling on an international flight
completely affects interstate and international commerce.
B. THE DIPLOMATIc APPROACH
As explained earlier, the courts prefer a diplomatic approach
to most effectively solve these types of conflicts. 76As such, the
effectiveness of bilateral discussions between countries, the In-
ternational Court ofJustice in The Hague, and the World Trade
Organization present possible solutions within this
framework. 1 7 7
Under the bilateral discussions approach, each country at-
tempts to resolve the dispute through direct conversations re-
garding the subject matter. In this case, upon the passage of the
Gorton Amendment, the embassies of numerous countries and
the European Commission immediately notified the U.S. De-
partment of State that the prohibition against gambling and the
incapacity to have such devices on an aircraft infringed upon
each nation's sovereignty."78
Furthermore, Virgin Atlantic Airways tried to explain to the
U.S. government that the latest bilateral agreement with the
United Kingdom invoked the same language used in the Chi-
cago Convention.1 79 However, the only response to these pro-
tests came from Transportation Secretary Federico Pefia who
insisted that for the benefit of U.S. carriers, the integrity of the
bilateral agreements must remain protected and that "[w]e
174 Carron, supra note 5, at 222; McCune & Andrews, supra note 5, at 371.
175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
176 See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 588 (1884).
177 See Carron, supra note 5, at 224-26.
178 See generally Royal Neth. Embassy, supra note 27.
179 Virgin At., supra note 27, at 8.
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abide by our agreements, and we expect our trading partners to
do the same.""18
Moreover, one commentator pointed out that the Open Skies
Agreement only allows the prohibition of gambling when an air-
craft enters U.S. territories; and due to its ratification after the
Gorton Amendment, it should supersede the 1994 interpreta-
tions." " Thus, the actions by Congress appeared to contradict
the policies espoused by senior members of the executive
branch and leave few options for negotiating an amicable
settlement.
In contrast, the International Court of Justice in The Hague
was established by the United Nations "to settle, in accordance
with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States
and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by
authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. "12
Its jurisdiction includes resolving treaties and conventions that
specifically call on it to provide resolutions for disputes.18
While this may provide a proper venue due to the language in
the Chicago Convention or because the parties recognize its ju-
risdiction, the United States withdrew its recognition of the
court's authority as binding and only accepted it on an informal
basis.' 8 4 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a decision
from the International Court of Justice is persuasive but not
binding authority in the American justice system. 8 5 Therefore,
any country trying to nullify the Gorton Amendment due to an
improper extension of jurisdiction by the U.S. government will
face difficulties from the compliance perspective.
Finally, the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides a fo-
rum for a nation wishing to overturn the Gorton Amendment to
get withdrawal from the U.S. government regarding the inability
of foreign-flagged carriers to allow gambling on airlines in terri-
tories outside of American jurisdiction. As an organization de-
signed to facilitate trade amongst its members and provide
180 DOT Threatens Chile With Retaliation Over American Dispute, AviATION DAILY,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 221.
181 Carron, supra note 5, at 223-24.
182 International Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/in-
dex.php?pl=l (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
183 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 36
(July 28).
184 See Carron, supra note 5, at 225. The author further explains that the
United States still might be forced in to the International Court of Justice
through the seventy treaties that specifically use it for dispute resolution. Id.
185 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 333-34 (2006).
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dispute resolution through compulsory compliance, the WTO
convenes an adversarial hearing in front of an impartial panel of
experts to determine if an impermissible act occurred.18 6 When
the WTO renders a final decision and the offending member
fails to comply with it, the aggrieved nation may seek compensa-
tion.8 v However, should the parties end up in a position where
neither country can agree on the compensation, the aggrieved
nation "may retaliate by suspending trade concessions. 188
An example of this type of action recently occurred in the
context of gaming when the small Caribbean nations of Antigua
and Barbuda filed free-trade disputes against the U.S. govern-
ment.'89 The complaints alleged a violation of the 1994 General
Agreement on Trade in Services treaty. 9 ° More specifically, the
countries explained that American gambling restrictions were
illegal because they prohibited offshore casino and sports gam-
bling while allowing domestic wagering on horseracing, fantasy
sports, and lotteries.' 91
Despite the U.S. arguments that the restrictions became nec-
essary "to protect 'public morals and public order,"' the Antigua
viewpoint prevailed. 1 2 Even though an appeals court reduced
the ruling, the United States must now either forbid all forms of
gaming or face trade sanctions approved by the WTO.'9 Anti-
gua already requested the right to copy and export U.S. made
CDs, DVDs, and other similar intellectual property if no finan-
cial solution becomes acceptable. 4 Moreover, many other
countries including the European Union, which represents
twenty-seven different nations, view this as an opportunity to
stop discrimination against legal activities in their own country
186 Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization:
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that international law deems permissible. 19 5 Thus, one com-
mentator views the WTO as the most effective opportunity for
another nation to force the U.S. government to stop imposing
its will outside its territorial jurisdiction. 9 6
C. RETALIATORY ACTS
This questionable action by the U.S. government of placing
gambling restrictions over foreign-flagged carriers while outside
American territories may leave other nations with no other op-
tion but to take retaliatory actions. One commentator ex-
plained that this type of behavior is easily foreseeable from a
nation wishing to challenge the U.S. government by passing its
own restrictive laws that force U.S.-flagged carriers to comply
with its moral, ethical, and competitive values when the aircraft
enters its own territory. 97 Another commentator analogized
the U.S. action as, "if France enacted a law regulating that only
wine could be served on flights to or from its country in the
interest of political, competitive, and moral concerns, one
would surely expect Congress to question whether France had
jurisdiction under international law to enforce such a law."' 98
In fact, the U.S. government considered this approach in the
past when it did not agree with foreign legislation. 99 In March
of 1998, the European Union's Executive Commission put for-
ward a proposal to require all aircraft entering its airspace to
adhere to specific noise requirements. 20 ' The U.S. government
explained that this action would disallow 700 freighter aircraft
equipped with hush kits from entering European territories and
would also harm American aircraft engine makers like Pratt &
Whitney.z°'
In response to the perceived threat, Representative James
Oberstar introduced House Bill 661 which required the Secre-
tary of Transportation to disallow any flights to or from a U.S.
195 Paul Ames, European Union Launches Investigation into US Internet Gambling
Laws, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Mar. 10, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/arti-
cles/ap/2008/03/10/europe/EU-US-Internet-Gambling.php.
196 See Carron, supra note 5, at 226.
197 Witt, supra note 11, at 357.
198 See Grover, supra note 38, at 244.
199 Bruce Barnard, U.S. Response Urged for Hush Kit Legislation, J. CoM., Mar. 14,
2000, at 15.
200 EU Defends New Aircraft Noise Rules Against U.S. Criticism, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 11, 1998, http://wv.highbeam.com/doc/1PI-19427833.html.
201 Bruce Barnard, EU Makes Another Attempt to Resolve Hush-Kit Controversy, J.
COM., Mar. 30, 2000, at 8.
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airport of any supersonic passenger aircraft that did not meet
international standards in the event the European Union
adopted its proposed noise restrictions.20 2 While the bill passed
the House of Representatives, the Senate sent it to the Commit-
tee on Commerce where it still remains in the pending cate-
gory.2 °3 Ultimately, most of the governments in the European
Union found a common middle ground with American inter-
ests, and the United States did not resort to retaliatory acts de-
spite a very costly battle in the interim.2"4 Hence, the U.S.
government can dictate to the world that it must behave by its
morals and standards, but creates a major backlash when other
countries try to do the same.
IV. RECENT IMPEDIMENTS
In considering the strategies for overturning the prohibition
on in-flight gambling, several developments since the passage of
the Gorton Amendment deserve an examination since they may
prove as obstacles to lifting the ban. First, the impact of the
tragic events concerning the crash of Swiss Air Flight 111 re-
ceived consideration because the aircraft involved was one of a
few in the world that received FAA approval to allow in-flight
gambling via its entertainment system.2"5 Second, Congress en-
acted the UIGEA as a means to stop legal internet gambling
from other countries via restrictions on the banking system. 2 6
With the new capabilities of in-flight entertainment systems, the
road to allowing gambling on international flights will encoun-
ter difficulties in receiving regulatory certification and in over-
coming the new limitations placed on banking transactions.
A. Swiss AiR FLIGHT I 1I
On September 2, 1998, Swiss Air Flight 111 crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean near St. Margaret's Bay, Nova Scotia, during its
202 H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced Feb. 10, 1999 by Rep. James
Oberstar).
203 Govtrack.us, Congress, Legislation, http://govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=hi06-661 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). This legislation only affected the Con-
corde, which made its last flight on November 26, 2003. Jill Lawless, Final Con-
corde Fies to Retirement in Western England, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 2003,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/l P1-87764709.html.
204 U.S. Drops Complaint Against 14 EU Nations Over Aircraft Noise, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 13, 2002, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-53616460.html.
205 See Stoller, supra note 12, at lB.
206 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347,
§ 802, 120 Stat. 884 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367).
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flight from Geneva to New York killing all 229 people aboard.2 °7
The unique aspect of this flight was that the aircraft represented
a limited number of airplanes that received approval by the FAA
to operate an in-flight entertainment system that among other
services delivered computer casino games that took wagers via
credit card.2 °8
Swiss Air began operating the system, developed by Interac-
tive Flight Technologies, on January 26, 1998, which was fol-
lowed by Lauda Air of Austria later in the same year using one
by the InterGame Company.20 9 In addition, Singapore, British
Airways, and Qantas began testing systems by the same manufac-
turers for use on their aircraft at a later date.210
However, almost immediately after installation, Swiss Air an-
nounced its disappointment with the system.21' Surprisingly,
the first sign of trouble occurred on the financial front where it
reported that only fifty passengers between the March report
and the maiden flight actually gambled the limit of $200, and
that the entire gaming revenue was "significantly less" than an-
ticipated.212 Then, technical problems began appearing with
the overheating of electronic boxes under the passenger seats
during flight.213 Some industry observers explained that the
heat problem occurred as a result of the large, video screens
coupled with a system that needed tremendous amounts of
power from the aircraft's electrical system. 214
Alitalia tried the Interactive Flight Technologies system in
1998 as well.215 However, Alitalia removed the system from its
aircraft after the airline determined the system was poor be-
cause it made the passenger accommodations too uncomforta-
ble by raising the cabin temperature, lowering the reliability of
its operation, and requiring the need to replace three to five
computer processing units from under the seats each flight.216
After the Flight 111 crash, both the FAA and Canadian avia-
tion officials immediately began investigating the in-flight en-
207 Stoller, supra note 12, at lB.
208 Id.
2 0 Id.; Ralph Schoenstein, Making Friendly Wagers in the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1997, at 5.
210 Schoenstein, supra note 209, at 5.
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tertainment system for starting a fire about fifty-three minutes
after take-off.217 Only fifteen minutes later, the electrical sys-
tems malfunctioned followed by the crash six and one half min-
utes afterward. 21 8 Based on this tragedy, Swiss Air voluntarily
disconnected the systems three weeks later while the Swiss Fed-
eral Office of Civil Aviation revoked its certification of the
equipment. 2 9 The FAA revoked its certification as well and
banned the use of the Interactive Flight Technologies system
one year later.220
Based on this accident, the ability to deliver safe gambling
functions via an in-flight entertainment system received a seri-
ous blow. Prior to this accident, the DOT study concluded that
the technology did not pose a risk to the primary purpose of
transportation. 22' However, this incident showed that the tech-
nology had not progressed enough to nullify the risks of deliver-
ing gambling through an in-flight entertainment system. Thus,
because the Interactive Flight Technologies system failed, any
subsequent applications to provide equivalent service aboard an
aircraft will be subject to a heightened standard of review.
B. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT
Another impediment to gambling in-flight will come from the
UIGEA. In October 2006, President Bush signed the Safe Port
Act to address concerns related to Homeland Security, which
also included the UIGEA.222 Due to its lack of success in stop-
ping individual gamblers over the internet, the government de-
cided to try something different by stopping those responsible
for enabling the online casinos to collect losses or pay out
winnings.223
Essentially, the UIGEA seeks to stop the flow of funds from
U.S. gamblers to internet casinos. The legislation makes it a fel-
ony for a person engaged in the business of betting or wagering
to knowingly accept money in connection with unlawful gam-





221 See U.S. DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 35.
222 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
347, § 802, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367).
223 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
224 Id. § 5366.
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ver, federal regulators are required to draft regulations designed
to compel financial institutions to identify and block restricted
gambling transactions; otherwise they face civil penalties.22 5
Basically, in order to prevent "unlawful internet gambling,"
the UIGEA forces financial institutions to choose between either
creating their own policies and procedures or complying with
the established policy for a designated payment system.22 a
Under the Federal Reserve Board's proposed rules, institutions
that participate in card systems and money transmitting busi-
nesses must identify and block impermissible transactions.227
One method the financial institutions may follow could be
similar to the one that ten banks voluntarily chose to follow in
an agreement with the State of New York in 2003 to block in-
225 Id. § 5364.
226 Id. The Federal Reserve Board's proposed rules list five "designated pay-
ment systems":
1. Automated Clearing House System
The ACH system is a funds transfer system, primarily governed by the rules and
guidelines published by NACHA, that provides for the clearing and settlement of
batched electronic entries for participating financial institutions....
2. Card Systems
Card systems are systems for clearing and settling transactions in which credit
cards, debit cards, pre-paid cards, or stored value products are used to purchase
goods or services or to obtain a cash advance....
3. Check Collection Systems
A check collection system is an interbank system for collecting, presenting, re-
turning, and settling checks or an intrabank system for settling checks deposited
and drawn on the same bank. ...
4. Money Transmitting Businesses
A money transmitting business is a person (other than a depository institution)
that engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including any person that
engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of
people that engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically
or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. ...
5. Wire Transfer Systems
A wire transfer system is a system through which the sender of a payment trans-
mits an unconditional order to a bank to pay a fixed or determinable amount of
money to a beneficiary upon receipt (or on a day stated in the order) by elec-
tronic or other means through a network, between banks, or on the books of a
bank.
Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,680,
56,683-85 (Oct. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233)).
227 See id. at 56,683-85.
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ternet gambling.228 The banks stop the transactions using tradi-
tional merchant codes for identification and blocking business
from certain organizations identified with internet gambling ac-
tivities.229 Each credit card transaction includes an electronic
authorization file, which provides a unique code for every
merchant and transaction. 230 By examining each code, the au-
thorizing institution may determine the type of transaction as
well as the requestor for approval.231
Thus, in-flight gambling on international flights faces a new
hurdle depending on the strategy employed by the airline. If
the carrier chooses to use the same approach as Ryanair where
the in-flight entertainment system simply connects to a specific
online gambling site,23 2 then those persons using credit cards
supplied by U.S. financial institutions will most likely have their
credit card transactions blocked. Moreover, this may cause
those affected passengers to behave disruptively while in
flight.233
Alternatively, a carrier may choose to directly deliver gam-
bling to passengers over the in-flight entertainment system con-
tained on the aircraft.23 4 Utilizing this method may cause
financial institutions to consider the airline a provider of unlaw-
ful gambling activities and block all of its transactions due to a
single aspect of the business model. This could also create situa-
tions where the passengers become unruly while in the air due
to an action outside the control of the carrier.235 However, the
biggest threat includes the possibility of the airline losing non-
gaming transactions. This may strike directly at an airline's reve-
nue through its ticket sales and leave passengers choosing alter-
native carriers to avoid the hassles created by the financial
institutions in their UIGEA compliance.
228 See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Ten Banks End
Online Gambling With Credit Cards: Spitzer Hails Establishment of New Banking
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233 See Flight Attendants, supra note 58, at 3; Nat'l Council on Problem Gam-
bling, supra note 98, at 2.
234 See generally IGT, supra note 55, at 1; In-Flight Phone, supra note 61, at 2;
Interactive Entm't, supra note 61, at 2; InterGame, supra note 51, at 6.
235 See Flight Attendants, supra note 58, at 3; Nat'l Council on Problem Gam-
bling, supra note 98, at 2.
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Hence, the UIGEA, due to its provisions that force financial
institutions to act in a law enforcement capacity, may also im-
pact any attempts to overturn the prohibition of in-flight gam-
bling on international routes.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the passage of the Gorton Amendment in 1994, it does
not appear that air carriers are any closer to allowing gambling
on international flights. The DOT's recommendation in 1996
to not take any action was disappointing despite the repeated
determinations that the primary goal of transportation could
safely coexist with such activity during international flights. The
DOT categorically concluded that all implications like the pay-
ment methods, equipment installation and operation, and be-
havioral risks from in-flight gambling to the primary purpose of
transportation could be achieved safely but chose to not take a
political stand on this controversial issue.
With respect to payment methods, the consensus at the time
of the DOT study established credit cards as the least problem-
atic choice by airlines, system manufacturers, and flight attend-
ants.2 3 6 However, the passage of the UIGEA probably altered
that viewpoint since those payment options that rely on the fi-
nancial institutions must overcome the new obstacle. As a re-
sult, determining a payment method for airlines with passengers
who mostly carry U.S.-issued credit cards would now create an-
other reason for utilizing smartcards unless Congress modifies
the UIGEA as well.
From an equipment perspective, Swiss Air Flight 111 showed
the tragic consequences of not thoroughly testing and scrutiniz-
ing an in-flight entertainment system prior to implementa-
*2371 hl tettion. While the DOT report noted the addition of gaming to
the flight environment poses very few technical risks, the Swiss
Air accident uncovered major flaws in the FAA inspection and
approval procedures whereby a system came to commercial use
without adequate testing and questionable installation. 238 At
this time, ten years of technological improvements have oc-
curred since the crash. These include the use of lighter weight
and stronger materials that use less space. Hence, Swiss Air
Flight 111 might have set a much higher standard for safety with
236 See generally supra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
237 See Stoller, supra note 12, at lB.
238 Id.
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regard to in-flight entertainment systems, but ten additional
years of continuous advancements in technology make that level
easier to achieve.
Until the Swiss Air tragedy and the passage of the UIGEA,
overturning the gambling ban on international flights would
only require a court ruling or removal of the Gorton Amend-
ment by Congress. Moreover, the success of Antigua at the
WTO with regards to online wagering shows that many coun-
tries maintain great amounts of leverage against the United
States, but do not know the full extent of their powers. Any
country with an urge to either assert its national sovereignty or
desire to lessen the fiscal constraints on its national carriers by
allowing gambling might challenge the American government
at the WTO in the same manner as Antigua to force the issue on
situations where its aircraft wish to offer this activity outside the
U.S. jurisdiction. However, the new layers of anti-gambling leg-
islation have placed additional hurdles on using credit cards in
the event a challenge succeeded.
If anything, the U.S. policy is indirectly moving further away
from allowing gambling on international flights due to events
and actions that seem on the surface to pose no threat to the
activity in the context of aviation but their underlying basis leads
our direction further towards the viewpoints of anti-gaming ad-
vocates. The air carriers who wish to provide gambling activities
on international flights that land or depart from the United
States or its territories will need to either persuade or force Con-
gress to act in order to create legislation that addresses these
various new impediments and sets forth a new direction that
provides a safe and efficient system for those airlines wishing to
offer the activity while traveling in the air between countries.
Therefore, depending on the impact of the gambling offer-
ings outside the United States on foreign airlines, Congress may
ultimately feel pressured to allow all international flights with an
American landing or departure point the opportunity to pro-
vide the activity in order to keep U.S. carriers competitive in the
marketplace.
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